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will	 a	 court	 find	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 political	 and	 administrative	 organs	 of	 the	 state	 to	 be	
unlawful?	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 considerable	 body	 of	 comparative	 scholarship	 has	 sought	 to	
capture	 variation	 in	 judicial	 redress	 in	 different	 legal	 systems.	 The	 premise	 of	 much	 of	 the	



















since	 the	 public	 law	 of	 most	 countries	 does	 not	 expressly	 draw	 such	 distinctions.	 	 Mindful,	
however,	of	the	larger	purposes	of	this	volume,	the	chapter	also	highlights	the	implications	for	
regulation	where	appropriate.	
The	 chapter	proceeds	 as	 follows.	 The	next	 section	presents	one	of	 the	 first	 and	most	
enduring	 contrasts	 that	 has	 been	 drawn	 between	 systems	 of	 public	 law	 and	 judicial	 review:		
judicial	review	of	administrative	action	by	the	ordinary	courts	in	the	English	common	law	and	by	
a	 special	 body	 (Conseil	 d’Etat)	 connected	 to	 the	 executive	 branch	 in	 the	 French	 droit	
administratif.	Initially	identified	by	the	English	scholar	A.V.	Dicey	in	the	late	nineteenth	century,	
the	 common	 law–droit	 administratif	 divide	 has	 since	 been	 re-examined	 and	 re-assessed	 by	
several	 generations	 of	 comparative	 scholars	 (Dicey,	 1885;	 Goodnow,	 1893;	 Garner,	 1924;	
Schwartz,	1949;	Mitchell,	1965;	Brown	and	Garner,	1967;	Breyer,	1993;	Brown	and	Bell,	1998).	
The	following	section	turns	to	the	difference	between	the	litigious	and	formal	American	system	
of	 law	 and	 public	 policy	 and	 the	 informal	 and	 discretionary	 European	 policy	 process.	 These	
categories	of	difference	are	largely	the	brainchild	of	Robert	Kagan	and	his	theory	of	American	













the	 potential	 to	 extend	 to	 other	 jurisdictions	 in	 light	 of	 the	 global	 diffusion	 of	 written	
constitutions	and	constitutional	courts	(Ginsburg,	2008).	In	exploring	the	three	classifications	of	
national	systems	of	judicial	review,	each	section	examines	their	historical	origins	and	draws	out	







legal	 discipline―constitutional	 or	 administrative	 law?	 Although	 the	 distinction	 may	 seem	
obvious,	as	it	turns	out,	different	jurisdictions	and	the	different	subfields	themselves	employ	their	





































courts	and	under	 the	same	 legal	principles	as	private	 individuals.	The	common	 law	model,	 in	
Dicey’s	analysis,	was	clearly	the	better	guarantor	of	the	rule	of	law	and	the	rights	of	individuals	
(Allison,	1996:	11;	 Lindseth,	2005).	 It	was	also	a	 reflection	of	 a	deep-rooted,	historical	divide	
between	 the	 limited	 government	 and	 liberty-driven	 tradition	 of	 the	 common	 law	 and	 the	




of	a	superior	 legal	tradition	deeply	committed	to	individual	 liberties,	 limited	government,	and	
the	rule	of	law.		
The	common	law–droit	administratif	divide	pronounced	by	Dicey	has	been	both	highly	








with	 continental	 Europe,	 political	 power	 was	 consolidated	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 monarchy	
relatively	early	in	England,	in	some	accounts	as	far	back	as	the	Norman	Conquest	(Ertman,	1997).	
This	 early	 state	 took	 the	 form	of	 a	 centralized	 system	of	 law	 and	 courts	 but	 a	 decentralized	
administration	that	rested	on	local	dignitaries	serving	on	various	lay	bodies	and	as	justices	of	the	
peace,	 as	 the	 office	 would	 later	 be	 called	 (Lovell,	 1962;	 Van	 Caenegem,	 1998).	 Although	
industrialization	 and	other	 social	 and	 economic	 pressures	 produced	 significant	 growth	 in	 the	
administrative	capacity	of	the	state,	the	early	configuration	of	centralized,	common	law	courts	

























over	 claims	 against	 the	 intendants	 and	 conflict	 between	 the	 two	 sets	 of	 judicial	 authorities	
continued	until	the	Revolution.			












in	 a	 special	 body	 connected	 to	 the	 executive.	 In	 sum,	 in	 both	 the	 Ancien	 Régime	 and	 the	
Revolution,	centralized	administration	and	a	specialized	 jurisdiction	to	oversee	administration	
were	 essential	 to	 the	 consolidation	 of	 political	 authority,	 at	 first	 in	 the	 name	 of	 absolute	
monarchy	and	later	in	the	name	of	republicanism.			
The	 configuration	 of	 administrative	 justice	 has	 changed	 considerably	 since	 Dicey	 first	
wrote	but	 there	are	still	 important	differences	 in	how	challenges	 to	administrative	action	are	
















the	 government	 (Brown	 and	 Bell,	 1998:	 47–50).	 In	 a	 set	 of	 developments	 that	 occurred	
somewhat	later,	the	English	system	of	administrative	justice	became	more	specialized.	Beginning	





made	 to	 the	 common	 law	 system	 of	 access	 to	 justice,	 discovery,	 and	 remedies	 to	 facilitate	
challenges	against	administrative	authorities,	resulting	in	a	litigation	model	tailored	specifically	
to	obtaining	redress	against	public	actors	(Allison,	1996:	23–29).		
Despite	 these	 transformations,	 there	 remain	 a	 couple	 of	 key	differences	 that	 fall	 into	
roughly	 two	 categories―organizational	 and	 doctrinal.	 On	 the	 organizational	 front,	 in	 the	
common	law,	challenges	against	the	state	are	heard	in	the	last	resort	by	judges	with	the	same	
training,	 professional	 experience,	 and	 institutional	 safeguards	 as	 all	 other	 members	 of	 the	
judiciary.	These	judges	hear	a	variety	of	cases	and	enjoy	all	the	traditional	guarantees	of	judicial	
independence,	namely	life	tenure	and	removal	from	office	only	for	serious	disciplinary	reasons.	
By	 contrast,	 in	 the	droit	 administratif,	 administrative	 litigation	 is	 brought	 before	 the	 Conseil	
d’Etat,	which	 is	composed	of	high-status	executive	branch	officials	who	not	only	decide	cases	
(adjudicatory	 function)	 but	 also	 give	 advice	 on	 proposed	 legislation	 and	 administrative	 rules	
(regulatory	 function)	 and	 who	 regularly	 rotate	 through	 important	 departments	 within	 the	
government	(Fromont,	2006:	121–22).3	Unlike	the	judiciary,	the	members	of	the	Conseil	d’Etat	
do	 not	 enjoy	 a	 formal	 guarantee	 of	 permanence	 in	 office	 (inamovibilité),	 meaning	 that	 it	 is	
theoretically	possible	(but	practically	unthinkable)	that	they	can	be	transferred	from	one	post	to	












for	 the	 Conseil	 d’Etat	 based	 on	 the	 final	 exam	 administered	 by	 the	 École	 Nationale	










allocating	 cases	 between	 the	 ordinary	 and	 the	 administrative	 court	 systems.	 	 In	 addition,	
administrative	 action	 involving	 a	 public	 service	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 special	 set	 of	 defenses	 and	







However,	 the	 notions	 of	 policy	 discretion,	 expertise,	 the	 public	 interest,	 arbitrariness,	 and	
fairness	that	justify	those	outcomes	have	been	developed	separately,	in	different	lines	of	cases	
involving	 different	 types	 of	 administrative	 litigation,	 and	 have	 not	 evolved	 under	 the	 single	
conceptual	umbrella	of	service	public.	
Moving	to	the	procedural	principles	that	inform	litigation	in	the	French	tradition,	they	too	
reflect	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	 public	 law	 (Fromont,	 2006:	 164–68).	 To	 obtain	 access	 to	
administrative	courts,	individuals	are	not	required	to	allege	a	particularized	harm	since	litigation	






contrast	 to	 these	quite	generous	 rules	on	 standing,	 remedies	have	 traditionally	been	 limited,	
based	on	the	same	theory	of	litigation	as	a	means	of	achieving	the	proper	operation	of	the	state	
rather	than	 individual	 justice.	 In	the	past,	 the	Conseil	d’Etat	could	either	annul	administrative	
acts	or	could	award	damages	in	tort	litigation	but	did	not	have	the	tools	to	afford	injunctive	relief	
to	 individuals	or	 to	 force	recalcitrant	administrative	authorities	 to	comply	with	 its	 judgments.	
Over	the	past	decades,	the	administrative	courts	have	obtained	a	much	wider	array	of	remedial	




Like	 the	 doctrinal	 and	 organizational	 composition	 of	 the	 two	 systems,	 the	 normative	
assessment	 of	 their	 relative	 merits	 has	 experienced	 a	 number	 of	 twists	 and	 turns	 over	 the	
decades.	Dicey	was	emphatic	that	the	common	law	stood	on	the	side	of	 liberty	and	the	droit	
administratif	 on	 the	 side	 of	 authority.	 This	 position	 was	 fairly	 representative	 of	 nineteenth-




criminal	 litigation	 (Stolleis,	 2001:	 215–18;	 Ledford,	 2004:	 208–11).	 	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 ultimately	
unsuccessful	Constitution	of	the	German	Empire	of	1849,	the	older	system	of	purely	internal	and	




adjudication	 from	 the	 Italian	 Council	 of	 State	 and	 vesting	 the	 power	 to	 decide	 individual	
complaints	in	the	ordinary	courts	(Mattarella,	2010:	1016).4	In	the	common	law	world,	Dicey’s	
																																								 																				





















the	 French	 system	 in	 the	 Yale	 Law	 Journal	 by	 noting	 the	 “extremely	 liberal	 and	 progressive	
character”	(1924:	597)	of	French	administrative	law	and	speculated	that	“[i]f	an	American	may	
venture	 to	 criticize	 its	 [Conseil	 d’Etat’s]	 jurisprudence	 he	 would	 say	 that	 it	 has	 been	 too	
progressive”	(1924:	627).	In	his	treatise	Justice	and	Administrative	Law	(1928),	the	English	public	
law	scholar	William	Robson	wrote	enthusiastically	of	the	French	system,	praised	the	emerging	
system	 of	 English	 administrative	 tribunals	 for	 their	 expertise	 and	 flexibility,	 and	 advocated	




administrative	 and	 ordinary	 courts,	 thus	 avoiding	 expensive	 and	 lengthy	 litigation	 on	 the	
appropriate	forum	for	hearing	claims	against	state	actors	(see	generally	Brown	and	Bell,	1998:	
297–99).	 Harking	 back	 to	 the	 nineteenth-century	 liberty–authority	 dichotomy,	 the	 European	
























bureaucrats	 with	 the	 power	 to	 oversee	 the	 regulatory	 initiatives	 of	 federal	 agencies,	















This	 is	not	 the	place	 to	weigh	 in	on	a	classic	debate	 in	 the	comparative	 law	 literature	
which,	 as	 demonstrated	 above,	 has	 a	 long	 history	 and	 shows	 no	 sign	 of	 abating.	 	 It	 is	 clear,	
however,	that	the	two	models	have	 important	consequences	for	cultures	of	 judicial	review	in	
France,	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 and	 the	 many	 jurisdictions	 across	 the	 world	 that	 have	 been	
influenced	by	 the	 two	 legal	 traditions.	They	also	have	 ramifications	 specifically	 for	 regulatory	
governance.	One	of	 the	most	 significant	 transformations	of	 the	 administrative	 state	 that	 has	














are	 institutionally	 mixed	 in	 the	 French	 system.	 	 The	 members	 of	 the	 Conseil	 d’Etat	 have	
significant,	direct	experience	in	the	upper	echelons	of	the	administration.	When	they	serve	on	









Dicey	 would	 have	 it,	 that	 the	 Conseil	 d’Etat	 is	 necessarily	 more	 deferential	 towards	 state	
authority;	indeed	it	might	very	well	be	less	deferential	because	it	has	professional	knowledge	of	















on	 a	 number	 of	 cross-national	 studies	 in	 the	 law-and-society	 tradition	 that	 examined	 the	
operation	of	the	administrative	state	on	the	ground	in	Western	Europe,	Japan,	and	the	United	
States.	He	argued	that	policymaking	and	dispute	resolution	in	the	United	States	in	virtually	every	
area	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 life	was	more	 lawyer-driven	 and	 court-dominated	 than	 in	 other	
democracies,	which	 instead	relied	more	heavily	on	discretionary	policymaking	by	bureaucrats	
and	politicians	and	hierarchical	dispute	resolution	by	judges.6	His	theory	applies	across	the	board	
to	most	 areas	 of	 law	 but	 has	 special	 relevance	 for	 the	 law	 of	 the	 regulatory	 process.	 Kagan	
demonstrated	 that	 American	 legislation	 is	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 legal	 challenges,	 involving	
aggressive	 lawyering,	 novel	 theories	 of	 constitutional	 law,	 and	 activist	 courts.	 The	 American	













punitive.	 	And,	most	 relevant	 for	 this	chapter,	 the	 regulatory	policies	enacted	by	 the	political	
branches	and	implemented	by	bureaucracies	are	more	likely	to	be	challenged	in	the	courts	and	









legal	 and	 institutional	 fragmentation.	 When	 the	 new	 programs	 were	 designed	 by	 Congress,	
implementation	was	not	delegated	exclusively	to	a	large	state	bureaucracy,	as	was	the	case	in	
many	other	democracies,	but	to	a	combination	of	federal	administrative	agencies,	state	and	local	




















administration	 can	 be	 conceived	 as	 a	 principal–agent	 relationship	 in	 which	 the	 legislature	
(principal)	 has	 incentives	 to	 delegate	 the	 power	 of	 policy	 implementation	 to	 administration	
(agent)	but	administration,	in	turn,	has	incentives	to	defect	from	the	policy	preferences	of	the	
legislature.	 Legislators,	 therefore,	build	 into	 the	 law	a	number	of	devices	 to	control	wayward	
bureaucrats.	The	innovation	of	the	leading	proponents	of	this	approach,	Matthew	McCubbins,	
Roger	 Noll,	 and	 Barry	Weingast	 (McNollgast),	 was	 to	 conceptualize	 control	 tools	 broadly	 to	
include	 not	 only	 statutory	 commands	 and	 Congressional	 oversight	 but	 also	 administrative	
procedure	and	 judicial	 review.	McNollgast	 argued	 that,	notwithstanding	 the	outcome-neutral	
appearance	 of	 many	 administrative	 procedures,	 they	 were	 designed	 to	 entrench	 legislative	
bargains	and	to	ensure	that	the	interests	that	had	prevailed	in	the	legislative	process	would	do	
so	also	 in	 the	administrative	process.	 In	 their	 framework,	procedural	 requirements	 related	 to	
transparency,	participation,	and	reason-giving	within	the	bureaucracy,	and	the	right	to	enforce	
such	 requirements	 through	 judicial	 review,	 allowed	 the	 interest	 groups	 behind	 the	 enacting	
coalition	 to	monitor	 and	 influence,	 either	 directly	 or	 through	 their	 legislators,	 administrative	
outcomes.	McNollgast	 captured	 a	wide	 array	 of	 procedural	 requirements,	 backed	 by	 judicial	
review,	some	of	which	were	relatively	new,	for	instance	specific	reporting	requirements	written	
into	environmental	legislation,	and	some	of	which	were	more	general	and	of	older	vintage,	such	











reduced	 role	 for	courts	and	 judicial	 review	 (Moe	and	Caldwell,	1994;	Epstein	and	O’Halloran,	
1999:	242–44;	Thies,	2001;	Strøm	2003;	Jensen	and	McGrath,	2011;	Rose-Ackerman	et	al.,	2015;	
Rose-Ackerman	et	al.,	this	volume).	They	focus	on	the	different	strategic	incentives	that	exist	in	
the	 institutional	 context	 of	 American	 presidentialism—an	 important	 aspect	 of	 fragmented	
American	government—and	parliamentarism,	the	form	of	government	prevalent	in	Europe	and	
much	of	 the	 rest	of	 the	world.	 In	 line	with	principal–agent	 theory,	procedural	 constraints	on	
administrative	action	are	 conceptualized	as	a	device	 for	 locking	 in	political	deals	when	policy	
implementation	is	delegated	to	administrative	actors.	Although	the	accounts	vary,	they	converge	
on	 a	 couple	 of	 characteristics	 of	 parliamentary	 government	 that	make	 procedural	 rights	 and	
judicial	 review	 a	 less	 likely	 strategy	 of	 political	 control	 for	 legislatures.	 First,	when	 the	 same	
majority	 party	 or	 coalition	 of	 parties	 controls	 both	 the	 legislature	 and	 the	 government,	 the	
likelihood	of	defection	is	lower:	administrative	agencies	have	fewer	opportunities	and	face	less	
pressure	to	defect	from	the	legislative	bargain	since	they	report	only	to	one	political	principal	
and	 not	 to	 the	 multiple	 principals	 of	 Congress	 and	 the	 President	 (especially	 problematic	 in	
periods	of	divided	government).	Secondly,	formalization	is	a	costly	mechanism	for	entrenching	
political	 deals	 because	 it	 reduces	 administrative	 flexibility,	 imposes	 cumbersome	 and	 time-
consuming	procedures,	and	introduces	third-party	monitors	in	the	form	of	interest	groups	and	
the	 courts	 which	 themselves	 may	 be	 a	 source	 of	 principal–agent	 slack.	 Thirdly,	 there	 exist	




of	 the	 concentration	 of	 legislative	 power	 in	 the	 governing	 coalition	 or	 majority	 party,	
administrative	procedure	operates	as	a	relatively	ineffective	and	therefore	unlikely	instrument	



















adversarial	 legalism	 and	 the	 European	 administrative	 state,	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 Rose-
Ackerman	departs	significantly	from	his	assessment	of	the	two	systems.	In	her	analysis,	the	costs	
associated	with	 procedure	 and	 judicial	 review	are	 outweighed	by	 the	 benefits	 to	 democratic	
accountability	and	policymaking	competence.	
	To	summarize,	adversarial	legalism	and	the	institutional	structure	of	presidentialism	have	
significant	 implications	 for	 the	 judicial	 review	component	of	 government	policymaking	 in	 the	
United	 States.	 As	 compared	 with	 other	 established	 democracies,	 policymaking	 within	
administrative	agencies	is	more	formal,	proceduralized,	and	adversarial.		American	bureaucrats	
are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 sued	 in	 court,	 both	 for	 having	 breached	 the	 onerous	 procedural	
requirements	 and	 for	 having	 failed	 to	 satisfy	 the	 substantive	 standards	 of	 administrative	
rationality.	 The	 difference	 applies	 precisely	 to	 the	 activities	 specifically	 associated	 with	 the	
regulatory	function—designing	generally	applicable	rules	that	regulate	liberalized	markets.	Other	
administrative	 activities	 such	 as	 the	mass	 adjudication	 of	 individual	 claims	 in	 the	 context	 of	
welfare	programs	tend	to	be	proceduralized	and	amenable	to	judicial	review	everywhere,	driven	
by	 the	 liberal	 commitment	 to	 fair	procedure	 in	 individualized	determinations.	With	 the	 rising	

















I	 have	 begun	 to	 elaborate	 elsewhere,	 outside	 of	 policing	 administrative	 actors	 for	 fidelity	 to	
statutory	mandates,	American	and	European	courts	take	fundamentally	different	approaches	to	
the	 judicial	 review	 of	 public	 policymaking	 (Bignami,	 2011:	 898–902;	 2012:	 148–60).	 While	
European	 courts	 safeguard	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 liberties	 from	 the	 burdensome	 action	 of	
policymakers,	 American	 courts	 seek	 to	 advance	 a	 particular	 vision	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	
administrative	 process.	 In	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 section,	 I	 elaborate	 on	 the	 two	 theories	 of	 judicial	
review,	suggest	an	explanation	for	the	different	jurisprudential	trajectories,	and	explore	some	of	
the	possible	implications	of	the	difference.		
To	 begin	 with	 Europe,	 the	 most	 prominent	 example	 of	 judicial	 review	 driven	 by	
fundamental	 rights	 is	 the	 principle	 of	 proportionality.	 It	 is	 associated	with	 the	 same	political	
philosophy	 of	 liberalism	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 historical	 development	 of	
















their	 powers	 and	 their	 intrusion	 upon	 liberty	 and	 property,	 including	 the	 principle	 of	
proportionality.	
Proportionality	was	used	 in	Prussian	courts	and	 legal	scholarship	to	curtail	 the	type	of	
action,	 if	 any,	 that	 could	 be	 used	 by	 local	 authorities	 to	 protect	 public	 health	 and	 security.		










the	extent	of	 the	action	of	 the	police.	 It	 should	not	be	presumed	that	 the	 law,	
through	 general	 authorizations	 by	 virtue	 of	 which	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 police	
operates,	wished	to	permit	such	protection	to	exceed	this	natural	limit.	(1904:	29)	
	
Thus,	 for	 instance,	 in	a	case	decided	 in	1880,	the	Prussian	Supreme	Administrative	Law	Court	













After	World	War	 II	and	 the	adoption	of	 the	German	Basic	Law,	proportionality	 rapidly	
became	an	overarching	principle	of	both	administrative	law	and	constitutional	law.	In	the	1950s,	




involved	 a	 challenge	 to	 a	 Bavarian	 statute	 that	 set	 down	 criteria	 for	 granting	 permits	 to	
pharmacies,	including	economic	viability	and	the	potential	harm	to	competitors.	A	pharmacy	that	
was	denied	a	permit	sued	based	on	the	constitutionally	guaranteed	right	to	choose	and	exercise	
a	profession.	The	Court,	 in	holding	for	 the	pharmacy,	assessed	the	 liberty	claim	based	on	the	
proportionality	principle	and	in	doing	so	provided	the	first	clear	endorsement	of	the	principle	in	







administrative	state.	Today	 it	 is	still	used	 in	the	economic	domain.	 	A	couple	of	examples	will	
illustrate	the	point.	The	first	 is	the	German	case	that	 led	to	the	adoption	of	proportionality	 in	
European	Union	 (EU)	 law.	 In	 Internationale	Handelsgesellschaft,	 a	German	company	 failed	 to	
export	the	quantities	of	maize	stipulated	in	an	export	license	it	had	obtained	pursuant	to	an	EU	
																																								 																				















properly	 informed	 of	 the	 overall	 volume	 of	 exports	 and	 imports,	 essential	 to	 regulating	 the	








real	 chocolate,	 the	 Court	 found	 that	 the	 necessity	 prong	 had	 been	 violated	 because	 of	 the	


















2012:	 186–87;	 Rose-Ackerman	 et	 al.,	 this	 volume)	 and	 the	 supranational	 European	 Union	
(Tridimas,	2006:	136–241)	and	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(Letsas,	2006:	711).	It	has	also	
spread	to	 legal	systems	outside	of	Europe,	 including	 Israel,	Canada,	South	Africa,	 India,	South	





government	 policymaking	 is	 the	 principle	 of	 equality.	 	While	 German	 law	 is	 at	 the	 origin	 of	
proportionality,	the	genealogy	of	equality	is	often	traced	to	French	law.	In	the	jurisprudence	of	
the	 Conseil	 d’Etat	 on	 general	 principles	 of	 law	 (principes	 généraux	 du	 droit)―higher-law	






the	 operation	 of	 public	 services,13 	equality	 in	 taxation,14 	equality	 in	 bearing	 public	 burdens	
(charges	publiques),15	equal	access	to	the	civil	service,16	equality	between	members	of	the	civil	
service, 17 	sex	 equality, 18 	equality	 between	 nationals	 and	 non-nationals	 in	 the	 domain	 of	




















generally	 recognized	 as	 the	 foundational	 case	 for	 equality	 in	 the	 area	 of	 public	 services,	 the	




Conservatoire	 and	 refusing	 to	 broadcast	 its	 concerts,	 and	 that	 it	 was	 consequently	 liable	 in	








pension	benefits	 for	mineworkers	which	only	applied	 to	workers	with	a	 lengthy	employment	













classes	 of	mineworkers.25	Of	 course,	 there	 are	 numerous	 instances	 in	which	 the	 Conseil	 has	
rejected	 equality	 claims,	 indeed	 probably	more	 numerous	 than	 those	 in	which	 it	 has	 upheld	





As	with	proportionality,	 the	equality	 principle	made	 its	way	early	 on	 to	 the	 European	
Court	of	Justice.		It	first	appeared	in	the	1950s	in	cases	challenging	civil	service	decisions	of	the	
EU	institutions27	as	well	as	High	Authority	decisions	involving	the	differential	treatment	of	coal	
and	 steel	 producers	 and	 users. 28 	Somewhat	 later,	 the	 principle	 emerged	 in	 challenges	 to	
regulatory	 decisions	 in	 the	 common	 agricultural	 policy	 area	 which	 discriminated	 between	
different	types	of	producers.29	It	is	also	common	to	the	administrative	law	of	the	member	states,	
in	particular	the	judicial	review	of	administrative	rules	(Fromont,	2006:	253,	293),	and	to	national	
constitutional	 law	 (Baer,	 2012;	 Kommers	 and	 Miller,	 2012:	 419–40),	 including	 French	
constitutional	law	since	the	expansion	of	the	Constitutional	Council’s	powers	in	the	1980s	(Stone,	
1992).	 Although	 there	 has	 been	 less	 attention	 to	 equality	 than	 to	 proportionality	 in	 the	
comparative	 literature,	 it	 appears	 to	 operate	 as	 a	 cross-cutting	 principle	 in	 a	 number	 of	
jurisdictions	 outside	 of	 Europe	 too	 (Huang	 and	 Law,	 this	 volume).	 In	 addition,	 similar	 to	
proportionality	and	important	for	understanding	judicial	review	in	the	context	of	the	regulatory	
state,	equality	is	a	principle	applicable	in	both	the	administrative	and	legislative	domains,	and	
















There	are	a	number	of	other	doctrines	that	are	also	designed	to	protect	 liberty	 in	 the	
context	of	the	contemporary	administrative	state.	These	are	generally	concerned	with	positive	
rights	such	as	government	benefits	and	have	been	recognized	in	the	primary	law	of	constitutions	
and	 in	 the	 court-generated	 principles	 of	 non-retroactivity,	 legal	 certainty,	 and	 legitimate	
expectations	 (Kommers	 and	 Miller,	 2012:	 622–23;	 Bignami	 and	 Spivack,	 2014).	 While	 the	
constitutional	 law	generally	begins	 from	the	premise	 that	 individuals	are	entitled	 to	a	certain	
minimum	 level	 of	welfare	 from	 the	 state,	 the	 judge-made	 principles	 are	 designed	 to	 restrict	
changes	 to	 government	 programs	 once	 they	 have	 been	 put	 into	 place	 by	 legislative	 and	
administrative	actors.				
In	 the	American	system,	by	contrast,	 individual	 rights	 rarely	 form	the	basis	 for	 judicial	
review	 of	 the	 market-regulating	 and	 welfare-distributing	 functions	 of	 the	 contemporary	
administrative	 state.	 This	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	 rigid	 hierarchy	 of	 fundamental	 rights	 which	 is	
distinctive	 to	 the	American	 system	and	which	has	been	amply	documented	 in	 scholarship	on	











interference.	 	 Therefore,	 cases	 involving	 rights	 such	 as	 the	 right	 to	 exercise	 a	 profession	 or	








courts,	 to	 define	 the	 scope	 of	 rights	 narrowly	 and	 to	 refrain	 from	 creatively	 interpreting	
constitutional	text	to	recognize	new	rights	(Currie,	1989).	This	has	had	an	impact	especially	in	the	
domain	 of	 the	 welfare	 state:	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 not	 recognized	 any	 positive	 social	 and	










the	other	structural	guarantees	of	 the	Constitution;	 in	 reviewing	administrative	policymaking,	
courts	 engage	 in	 what	 one	 leading	 administrative	 law	 scholar	 has	 labelled	 “proceduralized	
rationality	review”	(Mashaw,	2012:	289).	In	the	interest	of	space,	this	section	will	focus	on	the	
latter	 form	 of	 review—judicial	 oversight	 of	 administrative	 actors	 when	 they	 engage	 in	
policymaking.		Proceduralized	rationality	review	encompasses	a	number	of	doctrinal	grounds	of	
review,	both	the	procedural	requirements	analyzed	in	the	previous	section	and	in	other	chapters	
in	 this	 volume	 (Wagner;	 Rose-Ackerman)	 and	 the	 substantive	 standard	 of	 “arbitrary	 and	
capricious”	 review.	 Arbitrary	 and	 capricious	 review,	 also	 known	 as	 “hard-look	 review,”	 was	
originally	 designed	 to	 capture	 instances	 of	 irrational	 agency	 action	 but	 evolved,	 in	 the	 early	
1970s,	 into	 a	 highly	 demanding	 test	 (Breyer	 et	 al.,	 2002:	 416;	 Schiller,	 this	 volume).30	It	was	



















regulated	 industries	 (Olson,	 1965;	 Stigler,	 1971,	 1974).	 The	 response	 was	 twofold.	 First,	 by	
enforcing	a	demanding	standard	of	rationality,	courts	would	ensure	that	administrative	agencies	




awareness	 that	 agencies	 and	 courts	 together	 constitute	 a	 ‘partnership	 in	 furtherance	 of	 the	
public	interest’”	(1974:	511).	Secondly,	by	ensuring	a	fair	and	representative	agency	process	that	




the	 “interest	 representation	 model”:	 the	 use	 of	 judicial	 review	 “to	 ensure	 more	 adequate	
representation	for	all	interests	affected	by	agency	decisions”	(1975:	1669).		
Before	exploring	 the	 implication	of	 these	two	models	of	 judicial	 review	specifically	 for	
regulatory	 governance,	 it	 bears	 asking	why	 they	emerged	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	 comparative	
																																								 																				
31	European	 courts	 also	 require	 that	 administrative	 agencies	 give	 reasons	 for	 their	 policy	 choices.	 Such	 reasons,	












analysis	 reveals	 two	 quite	 different	 theories	 of	 public	 law:	 one	 that	 explicitly	 calls	 upon	
fundamental	rights	to	theorize	the	relationship	between	courts	and	the	administrative	state	and	
the	 other	 that	 is	 rooted	 in	 a	 duty	 to	 protect	 a	 specific	 understanding	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	
policymaking	 activities	 of	 bureaucracy.	 On	 the	 American	 side,	 the	 explanation	 rests	 in	 the	
experience	of	 courts	 in	 the	early	days	of	 judicial	 review	and	democratic	government	and	 the	
impact	 of	 that	 experience	 on	 the	 subsequent	 development	 of	 legal	 discourse	 and	 judicial	
behavior.	In	what	has	become	a	standard	narrative	in	American	constitutional	history,	in	the	first	






The	 period	was	marked	 by	 clashes	within	 the	 legal	 establishment	 between	 legal	 realists	 and	
adherents	 to	 the	“classical”	school	of	 thought	 (Horwitz,	1992)	and	by	contrasting	views,	both	
inside	and	the	outside	the	Court,	on	the	correctness	of	the	Lochner	line	of	cases.	It	was	also	a	
period	of	intense	conflict	between	the	President	and	the	Court.	In	what	has	become	a	notorious	
episode	 in	 American	 constitutional	 history,	 Roosevelt	 sought	 to	 “pack”	 the	 Court	 with	 six	
additional	Justices	who	presumably	would	have	ensured	the	constitutionality	of	the	New	Deal	
agenda	(Ackerman,	1998:	312–37).		
While	 the	 Court-packing	 bill	was	 ultimately	 defeated	 in	 the	 Senate,	 the	 Court	 shortly	
thereafter	reversed	course	and	began	upholding	the	ambitious	regulatory	programs	of	the	New	
Deal.	In	doing	so,	it	abandoned	several	different	doctrinal	threads,	including	the	substantive	due	











with	non-milk	 fats.34	(In	 fact,	 the	 legislation	at	 issue	 in	 the	case	recalls	 the	German	chocolate	
regulation	mentioned	 earlier	which,	 in	 contrast	with	 the	 outcome	 in	Carolene	 Products,	 was	
struck	by	the	German	Constitutional	Court	based	on	the	right	of	occupational	freedom	and	the	
proportionality	 principle.)	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 declared	 that,	 in	 cases	 involving	 “regulatory	
legislation	affecting	ordinary	commercial	transactions,”	it	would	generally	assume	a	rational	basis	
that	justified	the	use	of	the	police	power	unless	proven	otherwise	“in	the	light	of	the	facts	made	
known	or	 generally	 assumed.”35	Thus	 the	economic	 liberties	 that	we	have	 seen	are	 routinely	
litigated	 in	 European	 legal	 systems	were	 dismissed	 as	 outside	 the	 power	 of	 courts	 with	 the	
exception	of	egregious	violations.	By	contrast,	the	Court	indicated	that	it	would	engage	in	more	





ordinarily	 to	be	 relied	upon	 to	protect	minorities.”36	These	 types	of	 claims	were	 identified	as	
legitimate	 for	 judicial	 review	 because	 they	 were	 specifically	 identified	 in	 the	 text	 of	 the	
Constitution	or	because	they	served	to	protect	the	democratic	process.		
This	set	of	events,	together	with	the	dominant	interpretation	in	the	legal	establishment,	
















A	 considerable	 number	 of	 the	 decisions	 under	 the	 expanded	 version	 of	 due	
process	.	.	.	undoubtedly	are	expressive	of	an	extreme	laissez-faire	philosophy.	.	.	















the	doctrinal	 legacy	of	Carolene	Products	and	 the	double	standard	 that	had	been	created	 for	
social	and	economic	 rights,	on	 the	one	hand,	and	civil	and	political	 rights,	on	 the	other	hand	
(Bussiere,	1997:	99–101;	1999).	To	illustrate	the	approach	taken	by	the	academy,	take	the	work	
of	the	influential	legal	scholar	John	Hart	Ely.	In	1980,	he	famously	defended	the	Warren	Court’s	
criminal	 procedure	 and	 social	 rights	 jurisprudence	 against	 charges	 of	 Lochner-style	 judicial	
activism	on	the	grounds	that	the	Warren	Court	had	been	faithful	to	Carolene	Products	and	had	
sought	 to	 further	 “‘participational’	 goals	 of	 broadened	 access	 to	 the	 process	 and	 bounty	 of	
representative	government”	(1980:	75).	
Returning	 specifically	 to	 courts	 and	 administration,	 procedural	 rationality	 review	was	
quite	clearly	informed	by	the	larger	constitutional	context	of	Carolene	Products.	With	the	fading	
of	 confidence	 in	administrative	expertise,	 the	 fear	of	 regulatory	capture,	and	 the	 rise	of	new	





regulatory	process.	Safeguarding	a	general	sphere	of	 liberty	was	anathema	 in	 legal	discourse.	
Instead,	consistent	with	the	democracy-enhancing	theory	of	public	law	more	generally,	courts	
responded	 with	 the	 interest	 representation	 model	 of	 the	 administrative	 process	 and	 the	
requirement	that	in	the	course	of	the	rulemaking	proceeding	agencies	carefully	articulate	why	
their	 policy	 choices	 further	 the	 statutory	 framework	 enacted	 by	 the	 legislature.	 Although	








and	 equality,	 both	 of	 which	 are	 traced	 to	 nineteenth-century	 and	 early-twentieth-century	
sources.	Why	there	is	rupture	in	the	American	case	and	continuity	in	the	European	case	is	the	
question.	At	 least	 in	part,	 the	answer	appears	to	rest	 in	the	different	European	experience	of	
courts	and	elected	bodies	in	the	early	years	of	democracy	and	the	institutional	reputations	that	
emerged	 from	 those	 events.	 European	 public	 law	 has	 been	 deeply	marked	 by	 the	 history	 of	




military	 coups	 but	 by	 formally	 democratic	 procedures	 that	 put	 into	 place	 dictators	 and	 that	
abolished	the	political	freedoms	of	the	earlier	democratic	regime.	The	celebration	of	majoritarian	
democracy	and	the	directly	elected	branches,	so	apparent	in	post-Lochner	jurisprudence,	was	at	








At	 the	 same	 time,	 courts	 emerged	 as	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 the	 European	 post-war	
architecture.	These	were	primarily	newly	established	constitutional	courts	but	also	included	pre-
existing	 administrative	 courts,	 both	 of	 which	were	 cast	 as	 safeguarding	 a	 set	 of	 higher-level	
principles,	including	an	extensive	set	of	individual	liberties,	in	the	operation	of	the	political	and	
social	 order.	 Why	 public	 law	 courts	 took	 on	 this	 role	 is	 something	 of	 a	 puzzle.	 Courts,	 like	
parliaments,	 did	 not	 sport	 a	 stellar	 record	 during	 the	 1930s	 and	 1940s.	 In	 many	 cases,	 the	
ordinary	 courts	 and	 administrative	 courts	 were	 complicit	 in	 enforcing	 and	 in	 some	 cases	
stretching	the	law	to	deprive	Jews,	Communists,	and	other	groups	of	their	private	rights	and,	for	
those	 employed	 in	 public	 administration,	 their	 civil	 service	 status	 (Fabre,	 2001;	 Joerges	 and	
Ghaleigh,	2003).	In	the	republican	ideology	of	the	French	Revolution,	which	was	influential	not	




parliaments	by	 their	 involvement	with	authoritarian	or	collaborationist	 regimes.	Setting	aside	









of	proceduralized	 rationality	 review	 in	 the	American	 system.	 For	 instance,	 the	 claim	 that	 the	
regulatory	means	adopted	to	accomplish	the	public	purpose	were	inappropriate,	familiar	from	













also	 claimed	 that	 the	 agency	 had	 failed	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 special	 characteristics	 of	
whitefish	processors	as	compared	with	other	types	of	processors	and	to	treat	them	differently	
as	warranted	by	their	different	situations.	The	court	of	appeals	did	not	reach	the	arbitrary	and	
capricious	 challenge	 but	 held	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 litigant	 on	 the	 related	 grounds	 that	 the	 agency	
procedure	was	defective	since	 it	had	 failed	 to	answer	 the	 litigant’s	objections	 in	 the	“concise	










adopted	 by	 administrative	 authorities,	 then	 proceduralized	 rationality	 review	 applies.	 By	















German	cases	 like	 the	Pharmacy	Case39	or	 the	Smoking	Ban	Case40	would	 fail	or,	more	 likely,	
never	be	brought	in	the	American	system.		
The	second	notable	difference	produced	by	the	two	models	of	judicial	review	concerns	
the	 way	 in	 which	 courts	 assess	 the	 reasoning	 of	 administrative	 agencies	 and	 the	 hardship	
imposed	 by	 regulatory	 policies.	 In	 European	 legal	 thinking,	 when	 courts	 strike	 government	
regulatory	policies	based	on	proportionality,	equality,	or	any	of	the	other	doctrines	mentioned	







conceptual	 difference	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 how	 cases	 are	 decided	 on	 judicial	 review.	 On	 the	
European	side,	 the	tendency	 is	 to	 interfere	 in	absurd	cases	 in	which	the	reasons	are	patently	
flimsy	or	the	hardship	imposed	on	certain	groups	appears	to	be	entirely	out	of	proportion	with	
the	overall	 purposes	of	 the	 regulatory	 framework.	On	 the	American	 side,	 the	emphasis	 is	on	
carefully	scrutinizing	every	element	of	the	case	for	administrative	action—the	empirical	studies,	
the	interpretation	of	the	enabling	statute,	and	merits	of	the	different	policy	options―to	ensure	
that	 it	 stands	 up	 to	 the	 many	 objections	 made	 by	 the	 participants	 in	 the	 administrative	





















as	 giving	 courts	more	 license	 to	 interfere	 with	 the	 regulatory	 process.	 Therefore,	 it	 may	 be	
worthwhile	 revisiting	 some	of	 the	 empirical	 claims	 of	 the	 adversarial	 legalism	hypothesis.	 As	
explained	earlier,	adversarial	legalism	is	a	sweeping	concept	that	encompasses	all	aspects	of	the	
regulatory	 state.	 It	 may	 be	 true	 that	 the	 fragmented	 American	 system	 outsources	 more	
regulatory	 activities	 to	 private	 litigants	 and	 courts	 and	 therefore	 the	 system	 overall	 is	more	




which	 take	 into	 account	 both	 constitutional	 and	 administrative	 law	 and	which	 examine	 data	
recent	enough	to	capture	the	growing	importance	of	constitutional	litigation	in	Europe.			
If,	 however,	 as	 some	of	 the	anecdotal	 evidence	 suggests,	American	 courts	 are	 indeed	
readier	to	strike	regulatory	policymaking	than	European	courts,	then	it	is	plausible	to	suggest	a	
relationship	 between	 the	 doctrinal	 theory	 and	 levels	 of	 court	 activism.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 the	
requirements	 of	 full	 public	 participation	 in	 the	 administrative	 process	 and	 comprehensive	
analysis	in	line	with	a	close	reading	of	the	statutory	framework	are	more	burdensome	than	the	
fundamental	rights	paradigm	of	judicial	review.	Although	rights	affect	all	state	action,	including	
legislation,	 the	 fact	 is	 that	most	 regulatory	 statutes	must	 be	 implemented	 by	 administrative	





procedure	 and	 reason-giving	 required	 of	 American	 agencies	 is	 more	 burdensome	 than	 the	
reasons	required	of	European	bodies	to	trump	rights.		If	true,	it	bears	underscoring	the	irony	of	
such	an	outcome:	American	doctrinal	thinking	on	economic	and	social	rights	was	driven	by	the	










of	 regulatory	 governance	 (Levi-Faur,	 2005)	 and	 public	 law	 (Ginsburg,	 2008)	 and	 can	 only	 be	
expected	to	become	more	so	as	the	globalization	process	unfolds	over	time.	The	ramifications	






















contrasts	 that	 have	 been	 drawn:	 between	 the	 common	 law	 and	 the	 droit	 administratif	 and	
between	a	proceduralized	and	adversarial	policy	process	and	an	informal	and	discretionary	one.	
It	has	also	identified	a	third	divide:		between	judicial	review	designed	to	safeguard	the	economic	




function	 of	 the	 administrative	 state.	 It	 is	 helpful	 to	 summarize	 them	 here.	 The	 spread	 of	






as	 a	 general	 matter,	 the	 enforcement	 of	 rules,	 in	 contrast	 with	 rulemaking,	 requires	



















involvement	 in	 both	 rulemaking	 and	 judicial	 review.	 In	 American	 adversarial	 legalism,	 the	
policymaking	process	in	bureaucracies	is	heavily	proceduralized,	and	regulated	parties	and	other	




economic	 rights	 and,	 in	 some	 cases,	 social	 rights,	 and	 employs	 the	 legal	 doctrines	 of	
proportionality	and	equality	to	assess	the	legitimacy	of	those	burdens,	whether	imposed	by	the	
legislature	or	 the	bureaucracy.	 In	 the	United	States,	 judicial	 review	 is	driven	by	a	concern	 for	
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